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ARTICLES
SUBTLY SELLING THE SYSTEM: WHERE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE TACTICS LURK IN
JUDICIAL WRITING
Anne E. Mullins *
"The opinion, as an expression of judgment, is an essay in per-
suasion. The value of the opinion is measured by its ability to in-
duce the audience to accept the judgment."'
I. INTRODUCTION
As a nation, we are deeply committed to the rule of law. Partic-
ularly with the rise of law and economics, we think of the people
served by the judicial system as rational actors. And, while many
of us recognize that our courts are inherently political institu-
tions, we still think of our judges persuading us with only solid
legal analysis.
* Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. J.D., University of
Chicago School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth College. I would like to extend special thanks to
David Bell, Xinmei Zhang and Yongge Dai Professor at the Wharton School of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, for introducing me to psychological influence tactics in business
marketing, and to Dr. Robert Cialdini's exceptional work in the field. I thank Suzanne
Rowe, Jen Reynolds, Anne Enquist, Michael Higdon, Lucy Jewel, Michael Sackey, Supar-
na Malempati, Cindy Archer, Emily Grant, and Tim Kelley for their thoughtful feedback. I
also thank the Association of Legal Writing Directors for their Scholars' Forum and Schol-
ars' Workshop; both were critical to the development of this article. Finally, I thank Meg
Kirschnick, Chris MacMillan, Dawn Jagger, Anna Makowski, and Caitlin Kelly Engle for
their outstanding research assistance and feedback.
1. Justice James D. Hopkins, Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIAL JUDGES' J.
49, 50 (1969).
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But we are not always rational actors, and judges do not per-
suade us with only their analysis. Judges capitalize on psycholog-
ical tactics that influence us to do what they tell us to do or to
conclude that their decisions are, in fact, the correct ones. These
are the same tactics that market participants of all stripes, from
big businesses to fundraising charities to kids selling lemonade,
use to get what they want.
Think of the well-placed advertisement or the successful sales-
person. They influence us with more than the content of their
message. We, as rational actors, realize that we have ended up
with a product we really did not need or want. But we bought
them anyway, and not because we were persuaded by the bare
facts that the ad or the salesperson imparted. There is more to in-
fluence in marketing than the bare information communicated.
This article explores whether there is more to influence in judicial
writing than the bare legal analysis provided and concludes that
there is.
Specifically, this article examines the subtle psychological ways
that courts and our judicial system as a whole influence us to do
what courts tell us to do. In Part II, this article will review four of
the six most basic psychological principles of influence identified
and organized by Dr. Robert Cialdini.2 As Cialdini notes, "there
are thousands of different tactics that compliance practitioners
employ to produce yes[;] the majority fall within six basic catego-
ries. Each of these categories is governed by a fundamental psy-
chological principle that directs human behavior and, in so doing,
gives the tactics their power."' These tactics include reciproca-
tion, commitment and consistency,' social proof,6 liking,' authori-
ty,8 and scarcity.' This article will then explore whether and how
the tactics of reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social
proof, and liking are either built into our judicial system or em-
2. Robert Cialdini, Ph.D., is Regents' Professor of Psychology and Marketing at Ari-
zona State University, where he has also been named Distinguished Graduate Research
Professor. He specializes in, among other things, persuasion and compliance and is recog-
nized as a leader in the field.
3. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE xii (5th ed. 2009).
4. See id. at 18-49.
5. See id. at 51-95.
6. See id. at 97-139.
7. See id. at 141-72.
8. See id. at 174-96.
9. See id. at 193-225.
1112 [Vol. 48:1111
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE TACTICS
ployed by judges in their writing to effect compliance. Further,
Part III will explore what benefits, concerns, and questions the
use of psychological influence tactics in judicial writing raises.
II. EXAMINING THE TACTICS AND UNCOVERING THEIR
HIDING PLACES
A. Why the Tactics of Influence Work
We are faced with thousands of decisions every day, and we
live in a world saturated with information. If we weighed each
piece of evidence and thought through pros and cons every time
we had to make a decision, we would be paralyzed. Therefore, in-
stead of carefully weighing each decision with which we are faced,
we rely on proxies for good decision-making. 0 Psychologists term
these proxies "judgmental heuristics."n These proxies are readily
accessible indicators that tell us whether a particular decision is
"right" (or at least "right" enough)." Cialdini studied these prox-
ies by inserting himself into the world of compliance professionals
(salespersons, fundraisers, etc.) because compliance professionals
are aware of proxies for good decision-making and are experts at
using them to get their targets to comply with their requests." So,
what compliance professionals might think of as tactics of influ-
ence are what regular people might think of as decision-making
short cuts (to the extent that we are aware of them at all).
For example, social psychologists Ellen Langer, Arthur Blank,
and Benzion Chanowitz tested the basic principle that humans in
certain circumstances are more likely to comply with a request
for a favor when the requester provides a reason." In their study,
a person approached a line of people waiting to make copies in a
10. Id. at 6-7.
11. Id. at 7.
12. See id. at 6-7.
13. See id. at 10-16.
14. Id. at 6-7.
15. Id. at 3-4; Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action:
The Role of "Placebic" Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 635, 636-38 (1978); Anthony Bastardi & Eldar Shafir, Nonconsequential Rea-
soning and Its Consequences, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 216, 216 (2000)
(noting that people often mistake non-consequential but closely related information for
consequential information when making decisions and alter their course of action based on
this mistake).
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library and asked to cut the line to make a relatively small num-
ber of copies giving as the reason: "Because I'm in a rush." In re-
sponse, 94% of the people asked said "yes."'6 In contrast, when the
requester gave no reason at all, only 60% of the people asked said
"yes."" To determine whether the quality of the reason dictated
whether a person in line would consent, a third group of re-
questers offered a redundant reason.'" This time, the requester
approached the line and asked to cut the line to make copies "be-
cause I have to make copies."" Notably, this is a non-reason.
However, 93% of the people asked said "yes."20 Accordingly, the
study determined that when the request was small, the quality of
the reason was (or was nearly) irrelevant to whether people com-
plied with the request." People generally comply with small fa-
vors when the requester gives a reason regardless of the quality
of the reason.22
While the third group may sound foolish from our present van-
tage point, they are actually acting in a completely rational and
efficient manner.22 Instead of spending valuable time evaluating
each request for a favor, determining both the credibility and the
worthiness of the reason advanced and rendering a decision, they
relied on the presence or absence of a reason as a proxy for the
entire thought process. Human compliance with a favor asked
16. Langer et al., supra note 15, at 637 tbl.1.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 637.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 637 tbl.1.
21. Id. at 637 tbl.1, 638.
22. Id.; see also CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that it is a "well-known principle
of human behavior" that people will perform a favor when the requester gives a reason).
23. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., On the Dialectics of Discrimination: Dual Pro-
cesses in Social Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 271,
272-73 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (discussing how relying on stereotypes
takes less effort and mental capacity than attending to individuality); CIALDINI, supra
note 3, at 7; Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation,
from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation
on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990) (positing that people predominantly use categorical thinking as
opposed to individuated thinking because it requires less work); Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel
G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 652 (1996) (stating that people consider a limited amount of infor-




alongside something that appears to be a reason is probably an
efficient and effective way to respond to the request.24
The Langer study not only demonstrates how decision-making
shortcuts work, but it also highlights the inherent danger of deci-
sion-making shortcuts. While trustworthy proxies usually trigger
appropriate responses, those who know how our triggers work
can activate decision-making shortcuts to elicit the response they
want, and that response may not be appropriate.25 In other words,
tactics of influence are not always innocuous.
The extent to which we are susceptible to tactics of influence-
that is to say, the likelihood that we will use a decision-making
shortcut-varies depending on the circumstances, such as wheth-
er the person is affected by the decision or cares deeply about the
issue. When people evaluate information in a thoughtful manner,
27
they are less likely to use decision-making shortcuts. And some
research bears this out.28 Significantly, however, Cialdini ques-
tions whether this is always true.2 ' For one thing, even when peo-
ple may be affected by a decision or when they may care deeply
about an issue, they may not have the time to carefully consider
24. See Bodenhausen et al., supra note 23, at 272 ("Although there may be procedures
available for reaching a decision or making a judgment that are likely to maximize deci-
sion quality, they are often cumbersome. Much simpler alternative strategies [like heuris-
tics] may be available that, although less likely to ensure a high-quality decision, never-
theless do a good enough job much of the time.").
25. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 7, 10-11.
26. This is why Cialdini dubs influence tactics "weapons of influence." Id. at 1.
27. See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic:
Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 311, 315 (2006) (examining how
participants who are less inclined or able to engage in effortful thought are less likely to
take time to arrive at a more accurate estimate to answer a question); Richard E. Petty et
al., Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 847, 849-52 (1981). Researchers studied the effect of the
hueristic that inspires us to believe someone simply because she is an expert. Petty et al.,
supra, at 849. The researchers had students at the University of Missouri listen to a
speech that advocated requiring seniors to pass comprehensive examinations before grad-
uation. Id. The speaker's expertise in the field of education persuaded the non-seniors (i.e.,
those not personally affected by the issue). Id. at 851. The substance of the speaker's mes-
sage, however, persuaded the seniors (i.e., those affected personally by the issue). Id.
28. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 9; Michael R. Leippe & Roger A. Elkin, When
Motives Clash: Issue Involvement and Response Involvement as Determinants of Persua-
sion, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 269, 269 (1987) (finding that when subjects were
personally affected by an issue, they were unlikely to be affected by influence tactics in
messaging; but when subjects were not personally affected, they were heavily susceptible
to influence tactics).
29. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 9.
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their response." Further, even when they do or when they are re-
quired to carefully consider their response, research shows that
people still rely on decision-making shortcuts." The example that
Cialdini uses is "Captainitis."S2 This is when a co-pilot employs
the decision-making shortcut of reliance on authority: in defer-
ring to the pilot, the co-pilot permits the pilot to commit a fatal
error." The co-pilot, even though personally affected by the deci-
sion, nevertheless uses a decision-making shortcut." At the very
least, it is fair to say that people are likely affected by influence
tactics to some degree in most decisions.
B. The Rule of Reciprocation
1. An Overview of the Rule of Reciprocation
One of the most powerful and pervasive tactics of influence is
the "rule of reciprocation."" The rule is simple: when people do
something nice for us, we repay them." For instance, if a col-
league has you over to dinner, you reciprocate by inviting that
colleague to dinner the next month. If a friend buys your child's
Girl Scout Cookies, you buy that friend's child's raffle tickets. We
are brought up to follow the rule; one who does not reciprocate is
known to be a "moocher, ingrate, or freeloader.""
Psychologist Dennis Regan tested the rule of reciprocation in
an experiment that his test subjects thought was about art appre-
ciation." The subjects were seated in a room in pairs and told to
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing H. Clayton Foushee, Dyads and Triads at 35,000 Feet: Factors Affecting
Group Process and Aircrew Performance, 29 AM. PSYCHOL. 885, 892 (1984)).
33. Id. at 9.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 19. All human societies ascribe to the rule. See generally Alvin W. Gouldner,
The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 161 (1960) (suggest-
ing reciprocity as a universal building block in "moral codes" of all societies).
36. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 19.
37. Id. at 22; see also Claus Wedekind & Manfred Milinski, Cooperation Through Im-
age Scoring in Humans, 288 Scl. 850, 850-51 (2000) ('The idea is that helping someone, or
refusing to do so, has an impact on an individual's image score within a group. This score
reflects an individual's reputation and status, which are constantly assessed and reas-
sessed by others and which may be taken into account by them in future social interac-
tions.").
38. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 22; Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on
Compliance, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 627, 631 (1971).
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rate the paintings they observed." One member of the pair was
Regan's lab assistant. 40 Each time the experiment was conducted,
the assistant would excuse himself from the room.' Sometimes he
would come back with a soda for himself and one for the other
participant.42 Other times, he came back with nothing." Later on,
the assistant would ask his partner to buy some raffle tickets at
$0.25 each." The assistant was far more successful selling tickets
to participants on whom he bestowed a soda-they bought twice
as many tickets as participants who did not receive a soda."
The rule of reciprocation is not limited to social interaction.
Companies capitalize on the rule of reciprocation when they dole
out "free" samples.46 Additionally, our political system thrives on





44. Id. at 632.
45. Id. at 633-35. Other researchers have consistently discovered similar results. See
Jeannine M. James & Richard Bolstein, The Effect of Monetary Incentives and Follow-up
Mailings on the Response Rate and Response Quality in Mail Surveys, 54 PUB. OPINION Q.
346, 359 (1990) (discovering that mailing monetary incentives along with surveys pro-
duced a significantly higher response rate); Eleanor Singer et al., Experiments with Incen-
tives in Telephone Surveys, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 171, 171 (2000) (sending monetary gift
with survey delivered by mail greatly increased the response rate); David B. Strohmetz et
al., Sweetening the Till: The Use of Candy to Increase Restaurant Tipping, 32 J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 300, 306-07 (2002) (finding that giving customers a candy or mint with the
bill significantly increased tip amounts); Keith Warriner et al., Charities, No; Lotteries,
No; Cash, Yes: Main Effects and Interactions in a Canadian Incentives Experiment, 60
PUB. OPINION Q. 542, 545-46 (1996) (sending monetary gift with survey delivered by mail
greatly increased the response rate); Stephanie L. Gruner, Reward Good Customers, INC.
MAG. (Nov. 1, 1996), http://www.inc.com/magazine/19961101/1868.html (reporting that
customers purchase goods and services they would have otherwise declined after receiving
a gift).
Significantly, Regan discovered not only that the rule of reciprocation worked, but also
that it worked even when the target did not like the requester-a factor that typically does
not lead to compliance. Regan, supra note 38, at 635. As Cialdini notes, Regan's discovery
has potentially far-reaching implications: "People we might ordinarily dislike-unsavory
or unwelcome sales operators, disagreeable acquaintances, representatives of strange or
unpopular organizations--can greatly increase the chance that we will do what they wish
merely by providing us with a small favor prior to their requests." CIALDINI, supra note 3,
at 23. Cialdini further highlights the rise of the generally unpopular Hare Krishna Society
in the 1970s. Id. at 23-25. Initially, their fundraising technique was for a group to appear
in public together, with their customary shaved heads and robes, and bob and chant while
seeking donations from passersby. Id. at 24 The approach did not work well. Id. Then the
Krishnas started to capitalize on the rule of reciprocation and gave a small gift-a copy of
the Bhagavad Gita, a Krishna magazine, or a flower-before asking for donations. Id. at
25. The donations skyrocketed. Id.
46. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 28-31.
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the exchange of favors. 47 For example, two incumbent members of
Congress were initially against an exemption that the insurance
industry had from federal antitrust laws.4 8 After the industry do-
nated an average of more than $56,000 to each representative, it
switched sides and supported the exemption." Significantly,
"[t]he average industry contribution to individual committee
members voting in favor of the industry was $44,030, with those
voting against the industry taking in an average of just
$16,300."5o Special interest groups likewise capitalize on the rule
of reciprocation. Multiple studies link donations by special inter-
est groups to the campaign of an elected official with voting pat-
terns that are favorable to the contributing interest group."
The rule of reciprocation also works when the gift or favor per-
formed is a concession.52 The recipient of a concession frequently
feels obligated to make a concession in return." In other words,
the rule of reciprocation becomes the rule of reciprocal conces-
sions.
The rule of reciprocal concessions has been used in the "rejec-
tion-then-retreat" technique, also termed the "door-in-the-face"
47. See, e.g., id. 26-28. As Cialdini notes, President Lyndon Johnson was remarkably
effective in getting legislation passed during his time in the White House. Id. at 26-27.
Much of his success is credited to his long tenure in Congress, during which he performed
favors for his colleagues. Id. As president, he made no bones about calling in return favors.
As a result, he got legislation passed. Id.
48. JEAN COBB, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, SHORT CHANGED: How




51. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 28; Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Con-
gressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 85, 109-10
(1998). Similarly, some studies have linked favorable court outcomes to judicial campaign
donations. See Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 281, 282 (2007); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics,
and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
583, 584 (2002); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 1; Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Cash
and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A14. But see Ronald D. Rotunda, Consti-
tutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (2011).
52. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 35-37.
53. Id. at 36; Kelton V. L. Rhoads & Robert Cialdini, The Business of Influence: Prin-
ciples That Lead to Success in Commercial Settings, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 513, 514 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau
eds., 2002) (noting that the norm of reciprocity "obligates people to return assistance they
may have received from others").
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technique." When the requester wants someone ("the target") to
comply with a request, she can increase the likelihood of compli-
ance by making a larger request at the outset.5 5 When the target
refuses, she can then make the intended smaller request." The
target is likely to comply with the smaller request because, by
lessening the request, the target perceives the requester as hav-
ing made a concession.5 ' The proper reciprocal concession is to
comply with the smaller request."
Some research suggests that the rejection-then-retreat tech-
nique is most effective when there is no time lapse between the
requests and the smaller request immediately follows the larger
one." Significantly, one of the by-products of concession is a
greater degree of satisfaction with the final agreement."o
Kathryn Stanchi advocates the use of the rejection-then-retreat
technique by advocates in legal writing." Stanchi notes that the
plaintiff-respondent in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson"
used this technique, possibly to her advantage. Specifically,
Mechelle Vinson's brief began with an attack on the grant of cer-
54. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 37; DANIEL J. O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND
RESEARCH 230 (2d ed. 2002).
55. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 37; O'KEEFE, supra note 54, at 232-33.
56. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 37-38; O'KEEFE, supra note 54, at 232-33.
57. O'KEEFE, supra note 54, at 232-33.
58. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 38; O'KEEFE, supra note 54, at 233. Children are mas-
ters of the rule of reciprocal concessions. Most parents have found themselves in the mid-
dle of an exchange that goes something like this:
Child: "Can I go to Busch Gardens?"
Parent: "No."
Child: "Then can Sara come over?"
Parent: "Ok."
59. See O'KEEFE, supra note 53, at 233-34 (including other techniques such as keep-
ing the identity of the requester the same and making the requests face-to-face).
60. See Alan A. Benton et al., Effects of Extremity of Offers and Concession Rate on the
Outcomes of Bargaining, 24 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 73, 73-74, 79-80 (1972)
(finding that negotiators whose opponents made concessions during the course of the nego-
tiation were more pleased with the final agreement than their counterparts whose oppo-
nents made few or no concessions, even though the former group ended up with less mon-
ey).
61. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 432-34 (2006).
62. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson, Meritor Savings Bank
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1986 WL 728234, at *1, *9-44 [hereinaf-
ter Respondent's Brief]; see Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1-6, Meritor Savings Bank FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1986 WL 728303, at *1-7 [hereinafter Petition-
er's Reply Brief|.
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tiorari." It was a major request in two ways. First, the Supreme
Court rarely overturns its decisions granting certiorari.6 4 Second,
granting the request would have been a "slam-dunk" win for
Vinson because the court of appeals' opinion from which the ap-
peal originated was highly favorable to Vinson." Though Vinson
lost the certiorari argument, she prevailed in many of the follow-
ing arguments and won the case overall." Use of the rejection-
then-retreat technique is probably not the reason why Vinson
won the appeal, but it may have increased her chances of success.
The contrast principle enhances the effectiveness of the rejec-
tion-then-retreat technique.6 7 The contrast principle provides that
when we encounter two items, and the second is reasonably dif-
ferent from the first, our minds will accentuate the difference."
This principle is illustrated in Vinson's arguments, as her argu-
ments following her aggressive opening likely seemed less far-
reaching than they actually were.
2. The Rule of Reciprocation in the Judicial System
The rule of reciprocation surfaces in our judicial system in sev-
eral different forms. At the most basic level, the operation of a ju-
dicial system itself is a benefit conferred on litigants and society
as a whole. The American judicial system is funded by tax dollars.
In reality, the system is a gift we give to ourselves rather than a
gift that the judicial system has conferred upon us. But the rule
63. Stanchi, supra note 61, at 432; Respondent's Brief, supra note 62, at *9.
64. See Stanchi, supra note 61, at 432-33.
65. Id. at 433.
66. Id.
67. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 40. Indeed, Cialdini credits the contrast principle as
"the only really plausible explanation" of the Nixon campaign's decision to break into the
Democratic National Committee's Watergate offices. Id. at 41. In a nutshell, before G.
Gordon Liddy proposed his $250,000 burglary plan, he proposed two other plans that far
exceeded his final, successful proposal both in terms of price and stupidity. Id. at 41. As
Jeb Magruder testified, "after starting at the grandiose sum of $1 million, we thought that
probably $250,000 would be an acceptable figure. . . . We were reluctant to send him away
with nothing." Id. at 42. Magruder summed it up, saying that "[h]e had asked for the
whole loaf when he was quite content to settle for half or even a quarter." Id. at 42.
68. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 12. Cialdini notes that retail salespeople capitalize on
the contrast principle very effectively. Id. at 13. For example, when a customer needs two
items, one more expensive than the other, retailers instruct their salespeople to show the
customer the more expensive item first. Id. This way, when it comes time to select the sec-
ond item, the pricier options will not seem so expensive by comparison. Id. As a result, the
customer is more likely to spend more money. Id.
1120 [Vol. 48:1111
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of reciprocation does not require a true gift; it requires only that
the recipient perceives the benefit conferred as a true gift.69 Par-
ticipants in the judicial system frequently perceive the operation
of the system itself as a gift, and they express gratitude for it.
Operation of the system includes the judge and/or jury listening
to testimony about a matter of great importance to the litigant.
The judge participates in the system by reading about the dis-
pute, requesting further information about it, reflecting on the
dispute and what the consequences of a decision might be, and ul-
timately resolving the dispute. The system also includes more pe-
ripheral aspects of a litigant's experience, such as court staff that
assist litigants throughout the course of the litigation by offering
helpful information, welcoming them to the courthouse, maintain-
ing informational websites, and, in the case of pro se litigants,
providing resources to guide them through the litigation. Signifi-
cantly, when litigants feel that they have been heard by a judge
or jury, they are more satisfied with the result, even when the re-
sult is unfavorable.o It stands to reason that these litigants will
be more likely to comply with decisions in their own case and in
other cases.
The rule of reciprocation also enhances compliance with court
decisions because society has a common interest in maintaining
order. One reason we have an orderly society is that we have a
highly effective and functional judicial system. If we want to
maintain order, we must abide by court decisions-even decisions
with which we disagree. Professor David S. Law makes a similar
suggestion when he theorizes that people comply with court deci-
69. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 47-49.
70. For examples of studies that underscore the concept that people feel more satisfied
with a result when the other party involved makes a concession, see E. Allan Lind et al.,
Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision
Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224-25 (1993) (presenting two studies in which the deci-
sion to accept an arbitrator's award or reject it and proceed to trial was strongly correlated
with perceptions of procedural justice).
A second process factor that contributes to party satisfaction with mediation
is the perceived fairness of the process. Most parties believe the mediation
process is fair, regardless of how they define fairness, and this perception fa-
cilitates party satisfaction with mediation. Moreover, research suggests that
perceptions of fairness promote compliance with mediation agreements; com-
pliance, in turn, may increase the likelihood of party satisfaction with the
process.
Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive Me-
diation Statute, 13 OHIo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 885, 892-93 (1998).
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sions so that we can successfully coordinate our actions." To this
end, while parties might wish for different outcomes in litigation,
they likely share the same underlying desire to reach a result
without resorting to violence.72 Through their participation in liti-
gation, parties set the expectation that they will abide by the
court's ruling. The winning side expects to, and will be expected
to, exercise its rights under the court's ruling; the losing side ex-
pects to, and will be expected to, respect that exercise of rights."
Thus, the parties coordinate their actions to reach a non-violent
resolution.
3. The Rule of Reciprocation in Judicial Opinions
a. The Gift of a Reason
Many courts issue written opinions along with their orders,
particularly dispositive orders. Supreme Court opinions, the most
far-reaching opinions impacting public policy, are always written.
In issuing a written opinion, judges give the litigants and the
general public reasons supporting their decision. The opinion,
which is not required in every case, could be perceived as a sort of
gift or favor in itself because a judge, or group of judges, put in
time to provide the written justification for a decision. Moreover,
the opinion is a representation that the judge or judges learned
about, reflected on, researched, and decided a case-another pos-
sible group of gifts or favors. When a judicial opinion is viewed as
a gift or favor in itself and as a representative of other gifts or fa-
vors, we may be more likely to comply with its directives. Thus,
even though there are many reasons that courts write opinions,74
71. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723,
757-58 (2009).
72. Id. at 758-59.
73. See id. at 759-60.
74. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 104 (2002) (stating that "judges derive the most utility from
(and thus expend the greatest effort on) deciding cases in areas in which the opinion will
bring the judge prestige and other reputational benefits"); Lawrence Baum, Motivation
and Judicial Behavior: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry 1 (Univ. of Va. Workshop on Ex-
ploring the Judicial Mind, Mar. 30-31, 2007), http://faculty.virginia.edu/judging/Doc
uments/motivation.lb.pdf (stating that the most important consideration in judicial deci-
sion-making is making good legal policy). See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A
STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990) (stating that commitment to good policy is more effective in
providing judges with a self-perception of very high achievement or prestige).
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so long as the recipient perceives it as a favor, she will more like-
ly comply.
Social science research bears the conclusion out. Recall the
Langer study in which people in line to use a copy machine com-
plied with a request paired with an apparent reason." Even when
the reason was really not a reason, but rather a repetition of the
request, the perception that the requester gave a reason was
powerful enough to spark compliance in the vast majority of sub-
jects. This may suggest that even when courts give inadequate
reasons for a decision, the simple fact that they give reasons at all
inspires compliance. The extent to which the appearance of a rea-
son, however inadequate, inspires compliance likely differs de-
pending on the audience. A personally involved litigant might not
comply with an order just because it has some reasoning attached
to it, however poor. However, the mere presence of a written opin-
ion likely inspires some measure of compliance among the broad-
er public, which has little reason to parse an opinion unless the
opinion has some special personal or national significance (and
even then, the vast majority of people likely rely on media organi-
zations to digest and explain the substance of the decision).
b. The Gift of Concession
Judges also make concessions in their written opinions that
may predispose their audiences to be more accepting of the deci-
sions they reach. Though a judicial opinion is not a negotiation,
judges nevertheless attempt to persuade their audiences that
their decision is the correct one. Making concessions is an effec-
tive technique to encourage compliance." There are at least three
types of concessions judges make in their written opinions: stylis-
tic, structural, and substantive. A stylistic concession is a state-
ment, unnecessary to the resolution of the dispute, which creates
an atmosphere of conciliation." A structural concession gets its
force from the way different paragraphs or entire portions of an
opinion build up a reserve of goodwill on the part of the reader to
cushion an upcoming part of the opinion that may be controver-
sial or uncomfortable. " A structural concession may or may not
75. Supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
77. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.3.b.i.
78. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.3.b.ii.
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be related to the merits of the decision." A substantive concession
is a concession on the merits of a particular legal argument."o
The Supreme Court's opinion in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business et al. v. Sebelius," reviewing the constitutionali-
ty of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" ("Affordable
Care Act"), offers excellent examples of each type of concession.
Moreover, a reason the opinion is a particularly good one to re-
view is that Chief Justice John Roberts clearly wrote it for both
legal and non-legal audiences alike. For example, the entire in-
troduction functions as an easy-to-read civics refresher on the
enumeration of powers, the difference between state and federal
power, restrictions on federal power, and the provisions of the
Constitution at issue." Notably, for legal readers, the introduc-
tion is technically superfluous because the refresher is not sub-
stantively necessary to the rest of the opinion. Chief Justice Rob-
erts could have started with Part I. But he did not. And likely his
choice was based, in part, on a desire to speak to the Court's au-
dience, which encompassed a larger portion of the general public
because of the dispute at issue.
i. Stylistic Concessions
In his introduction, Chief Justice Roberts makes several stylis-
tic concessions. The very first paragraph of the opinion announc-
es, "We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies.
That judgment is entrusted to the Nation's elected leaders. We
ask only whether Congress has the power under the Constitution
to enact the challenged provisions."" The statement does not ex-
plicitly suggest that the Affordable Care Act is bad policy. But a
reader inclined to believe that it is bad policy can easily perceive,
lingering beneath the language, the suggestion that the Afforda-
ble Care Act may not, in fact, be good policy." This language is, in
79. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.3.b.iii.
80. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.3.b.iv.
81. 567 U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
82. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001).
83. 567 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2572-79.
84. Id. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
85. Recall that the rule of reciprocation works not only when the gift or favor or con-
cession truly is what it purports to be, but also when the recipient perceives it as such,
even if that perception is incorrect. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
1124 [Vol. 48:1111
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE TACTICS
effect, the Court's concession to those who believe that the Af-
fordable Care Act is not good policy. In the penultimate para-
graph of the introduction, Chief Justice Roberts reiterates the
concession: "Members of this Court are vested with the authority
to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the pre-
rogative to make policy judgments."8 6 Again, though not explicitly
stated, a reader who believes that the Affordable Care Act is a
poor policy choice can certainly impute a similar belief to the
Court. With these two concessions, neither of which is necessary
to resolve the substantive issues, Chief Justice Roberts creates an
atmosphere of conciliation with readers who are opposed to the
Affordable Care Act.
Significantly, Chief Justice Roberts does not make all of his
concessions to one side. Like the savvy interest group that do-
nates to both political candidates in a race, Chief Justice Roberts
appears to make a concession to those who support the Affordable
Care Act as well. In the final paragraph of the introduction, he
inserts a well-placed quote by former Chief Justice John Mar-
shall: "The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a
measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less con-
stitutional."" A reader who believes that the Affordable Care Act
is good policy can interpret the quote to suggest that the Afforda-
ble Care Act is a well-timed response to the current challenges of
the healthcare system-even though it may not be constitutional.
In other words, any upcoming decision by the Court that the Af-
fordable Care Act is unconstitutional is not a slight on the value
of the policy choice. Just like his two concessions to anti-
Affordable Care Act readers, Chief Justice Roberts' concession to
pro-Affordable Care Act readers is completely unnecessary to re-
solve the substantive issues. The value it adds to the opinion is
solely atmospheric.
ii. Structural Concessions
Chief Justice Roberts also makes structural concessions in his
introduction. For example, he starts his structural concession
with four paragraphs that provide an overview of Congress's
86. 567 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
87. Id. (quoting John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 190-91 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)).
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power under the Commerce Clause and the Tax Clause, the two
constitutional provisions at issue in the case.8 Significantly, he
presents each power as broad and far-reaching:
This case concerns two powers that the Constitution does grant the
Federal Government, but which must be read carefully to avoid cre-
ating a general federal authority akin to the police power. The Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
Our precedents read that to mean that Congress may regulate "the
channels of interstate commerce," "persons or things in interstate
commerce," and "those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce." The power over activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce can be expansive. That power has been held to au-
thorize federal regulation of such seemingly local matters as a
farmer's decision to grow wheat for himself and his livestock, and a
loan shark's extortionate collections from a neighborhood butcher
shop.
Congress may also "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare of the United States." Put simply, Congress may tax
and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government considerable
influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. The Feder-
al Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot author-
ize, forbid, or otherwise control. And in exercising its spending pow-
er, Congress may offer funds to the States, and may condition those
offers on compliance with specified conditions. These offers may well
induce the States to adopt policies that the Federal Government it-
self could not impose.
Chief Justice Roberts uses the most far-reaching decisions on
the Commerce Clause to illustrate the extent of the commerce
power: it "has been held to authorize federal regulation of such
seemingly local matters as a farmer's decision to grow wheat for
himself and his livestock, and a loan shark's extortionate collec-
tions from a neighborhood butcher shop."o The message is clear:
the government's reach goes far.
Next, Chief Justice Roberts characterizes the taxing and
spending powers. The taxing power "gives the Federal Govern-
ment considerable influence even in areas where it cannot direct-
ly regulate. The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activ-
88. Id. at-, 132 S. Ct. at 2578-79.
89. Id. (citations omitted).




ity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control."" Simi-
larly, Congress "may condition [offers of funds to states] on com-
pliance with specified conditions. These offers may well induce
the States to adopt policies that the Federal Government itself
could not impose."" Again, the message is clear: the government's
reach goes even farther.
Chief Justice Roberts does not stop there: he follows his broad
characterization of the Commerce and Tax Clauses with an even
more sweeping description of the Necessary and Proper Clause:
The reach of the Federal Government's enumerated powers is broad-
er still because the Constitution authorizes Congress to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers." We have long read this provision to give
Congress great latitude in exercising its powers: "Let the end be le-
gitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional."9 3
Chief Justice Roberts uses words like "broader still" and "great
latitude" to underscore the broad reach of the government
through the Necessary and Proper Clause. And again, the mes-
sage is clear: the government's reach goes farther still.
But Chief Justice Roberts does not stop there. He next explicit-
ly characterizes the Court's reading of these powers as "permis-
sive."" According to Chief Justice Roberts, this is because the
Court is reticent to strike down laws passed by elected officials."
In his own words:
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a
general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation's elected lead-
ers. "Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government" re-
quires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if "the lack of
constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly
demonstrated." Members of this Court are vested with the authority
to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerog-
ative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our
Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people
91. Id. at-, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
92. Id. (citations omitted).
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disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the
consequences of their political choices.9 6
It is only after Chief Justice Roberts has carefully set the stage
with sweeping government power and cautious judicial restraint
does he mention the Court's responsibility to ensure that the leg-
islature acts within the limits set by the Constitution:
Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdica-
tion in matters of law. "The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written." Our respect for Congress's policy judgments
thus can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal pow-
er that the Constitution carefully constructed. "The peculiar circum-
stances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but
cannot render it more or less constitutional." And there can be no
question that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the lim-
its on federal power by striking down acts of Congress that trans-
gress those limits. 9 7
Make no mistake: the Court's power is an awesome one. But by
the time the reader gets to this part of the introduction, the read-
er has just worked through a several-paragraph build up of the
expansive powers of the federal government. The one paragraph
on the Court's power is small and unremarkable by comparison.
The structure that Chief Justice Roberts used could very well
create an atmosphere of conciliation for readers who believe that
the federal government has expansive power under the Com-
merce Clause, and therefore the individual mandate was a valid
exercise of the Commerce power. By juxtaposing these several
paragraphs with his single-paragraph description of the Court's
power, he creates an impression that the Court's power is very
limited, and the Court exercises that power only in the most lim-
ited of circumstances. Notably, Chief Justice Roberts could have
trimmed down or omitted altogether the several paragraph build-
up, and he could have been far more generous in his treatment of
the Court's power and dedicated just as much ink to it as he did
to Congress's power. But to have structured it any other way
would have had a vastly different effect and would not have cre-
ated an atmosphere of conciliation for the same group of readers.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2579-80.
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iii. Mixed Structural and Substantive Concessions
Chief Justice Roberts also makes mixed structural and sub-
stantive concessions. He begins the merits discussion of the opin-
ion by issuing a win to both sides of the case and holding that the
Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA") does not apply to bar the suit." This
is a win for both sides because the parties agreed that the AIA did
not apply to bar the suit." The win is a particularly well-placed
concession because it precedes major upcoming losses for both
sides.
It bears noting that the AIA concession derives much of its
power as a structural concession from its placement at the begin-
ning of the merits discussion. But unlike the structural conces-
sions in his introduction, it is less likely that Chief Justice Rob-
erts placed the AIA concession at the beginning strategically to
create an atmosphere of conciliation. The issue was jurisdictional,
and the Court decides jurisdictional issues before turning to the
resolution of the actual dispute before it. Nevertheless, the effect
on the audience is still the same: it creates an atmosphere of con-
ciliation. As mentioned earlier, it is the effect on the recipient
that makes the rule of reciprocation work, not the donor's in-
tent.00
iv. Substantive Concessions
Now that both sides have chalked up a win, Chief Justice Rob-
erts turns to the merits of the individual mandate. The rule of re-
ciprocation operates in different ways in the treatment of the in-
dividual mandate. First, Chief Justice Roberts rejects the
government's primary argument that the mandate is a valid ex-
98. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2584.
99. See id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. The government, however, did advance the ar-
gument that the AIA barred the suit in the district court. The government lost the argu-
ment and did not raise it on appeal. See id. As a strategic decision, raising the AIA argu-
ment was a risky move. It would have insulated the individual mandate from review until
2014. See id. This could have been beneficial to the government because the tide of public
opinion could have lessened, if not reversed, by then. On the other hand, it is not clear
that putting off a decision on the merits is much of a win for the government, particularly
given that there is no way to predict the composition of the Court. Furthermore, the AIA
argument does not appear entirely consistent with the government's constitutional argu-
ments. See id.; Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (E.D. Va.
2010).
100. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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ercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.' Then,
he accepts the government's alternative argument that the man-
date is a valid exercise of Congress's tax power.102
On its face, it appears the government might have used the re-
jection-then-retreat strategyas in an effective way to get what it
wanted from the Court. To have used the rejection-then-retreat
strategy, the government would have had to advance the Com-
merce Clause argument first as its ideal argument, but one that
the government knew was really a stretch, similar to Mechelle
Vinson's opening certiorari argument."4 The government would
have had to follow its Commerce Clause argument with its "real,"
more reasonable argument under the Tax Clause, like Vinson's
arguments on the merits of her case. But it is highly unlikely this
was the government's intent because the government's argu-
ments did not fit the typical rejection-then-retreat scenario. The
government's Commerce Clause argument, even to those who
disagree with it, is not an extreme stretch. 0' It certainly was not
merely a ploy to set up the "real" argument under the Tax Clause.
The fact that the government's arguments do not fit the tradi-
tional mold begs a closer inspection of how else the rule could be
working.
Instead of the government using the rule of reciprocation on
the Court to get what it wanted, perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is
using the appearance of following the rule to market his opinion.
Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts presents the individual man-
date section of the opinion in a way that could be read to suggest
that the government's Commerce Clause arguments are an ex-
treme stretch. For example, he characterizes the attempted exer-
cise of the commerce power as if it were a brand new exercise of
power, unlike anything encountered by the Court before.' Simi-
101. 567 U.S. at, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-91.
102. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-2601.
103. Recall that the rejection-then-retreat strategy is one in which the requester poses
a major request likely to be denied at the outset in order to set up the intended request,
which is much smaller and more reasonable. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
105. Indeed, the government persuaded at least some members of the Court to its side.
See 567 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
106. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (stating that the government's theory "go[es] much




larly, the government's related Necessary and Proper Clause ar-
gument "work[s] a substantial expansion of federal authority."'o
Chief Justice Roberts' conclusions on the Commerce Clause-
dubbed "newly minted constitutional doctrine" by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg'0 -may seem a little more palatable next to his
acceptance of the mandate under the tax power. By appearing to
follow the rule of reciprocation and at least concede something,
Chief Justice Roberts may have made certain readers feel more
comfortable accepting what they perceived to be the more contro-
versial Commerce Clause part of the opinion.
C. Commitment and Consistency
1. An Overview of the Consistency Principle
Another powerful psychological force that pushes us to make
decisions we otherwise would not have made is the desire to
maintain consistency among our thoughts and our actions.o' Con-
sistency is highly valued in our culture."0 We associate consisten-
cy with honesty, stability, and reliability; we associate incon-
sistency with erratic behavior, confusion, and instability."'
Consistency is therefore typically an effective and efficient proxy
for good decision-making."' As a result, we tend to automatically
exhibit consistent behavior-even when doing so is against our
best interests. 1 13
107. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2592.
108. Id. at 132 S. Ct. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
109. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 53. Some forms of the theory are known as the theory of
cognitive dissonance, in which "the presence of a cognitive inconsistency of sufficient mag-
nitude will evoke an aversive motivational state-dissonance-that drives cognitive work
aimed at reducing the cognitive inconsistency." Eddie Harmon-Jones, A Cognitive Disso-
nance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 100 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002); see also
RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 225-28 (2d ed. 2003). See generally G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING
FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006).
110. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 53.
111. See Kennon M. Sheldon et al., Trait Self and True Self- Cross-Role Variation in the
Big-Five Personality Traits and Its Relations with Psychological Authenticity and Subjec-
tive Well-Being, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1380, 1381 (1997).
112. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 54.
113. Id.
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Our desire to maintain consistency is particularly powerful
once we have committed to a position or a course of action."4 Psy-
chologist Steven J. Sherman demonstrated the power of commit-
ment in his 1980 study of Bloomington, Indiana residents."5 He
called residents to ask what they would say if called by a certain
charity to spend a few hours fundraising on the charity's behalf."'
Many residents said they would."m When the charity actually did
call to ask the same people to fundraise a few days later, the
charity experienced a 700% increase in volunteers.
The consistency principle draws a significant amount of its
power from our inner desire to remain consistent."' Once we
make a decision, we create additional reasons to justify our
choice.'2 0 For example, some car dealerships offer customers an
outstanding price on a car, sometimes several hundred dollars be-
low competitors' prices."' Later in the process, something hap-
pens to remove that several hundred dollar advantage from the
sales price, such as the salesperson discovers an error, the super-
visor says no, or they need to add air conditioning to the package
at an additional price."' Even though the several hundred dollar
advantage may be the only reason why the customer began nego-
tiations with the dealership, most customers will not back out at
this point because they have created in their minds other reasons
to pursue the deal."'
114. Id. at 59.
115. See Steven J. Sherman, On the Self-Erasing Nature of Errors of Prediction, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 211, 217-19 (1980).
116. Id. at 217.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 83.
120. See id. at 84. See generally JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFERY Z. RUBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN
ESCALATING CONFLICTS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1985) (describing how a de-
sire to remain consistent can entrap a person in a decision); ALLAN I. TEGER ET AL., Too
MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT (1980) (describing consistency as a justification for prior invest-
ments of time and money).
121. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 84; RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF
PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 266 (4th ed. 2010).
122. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 84; PERLOFF, supra note 121, at 266
123. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 84-85; PERLOFF, supra note 121, at 266. Perloff refers
to this technique as "low-balling," stating that it occurs when:
a persuader induces someone to comply with a request and then "ups the
ante" by increasing the cost of compliance. Having made the initial decision
to comply, individuals experience dissonance at the thought that they may
have to back away from their commitment. Once individuals have committed
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2. The Consistency Principle Forms the Foundation of our
Judicial System
The consistency principle provides some of the fundamental
tenets of our legal system, such as treating like cases alike.124 JUS-
tice Stephen Breyer notes "[a] just legal system seeks not only to
treat different cases differently but also to treat like cases
alike."'25 The use of precedent ensures that judges actually treat
like cases alike.126
Similarly, courts typically interpret the same statutory lan-
guage to mean the same thing, even when the language is used in
different schemes.'27 As then-Chief Judge Carolyn King explained,
"as a matter of statutory interpretation, in determining the
meaning of a particular statutory provision, it is helpful to con-
sider the interpretation of other statutory provisions that employ
the same or similar language." 2
The doctrine of stare decisis is the formal constraint built into
the system to ensure consistency. Treating like cases alike, and
similar language similarly, is not only an accepted form of admin-
istering justice but a shortcut that saves judges from re-inventing
the proverbial wheel every time they encounter a new dispute.129
Just as the consistency principle relieves people from having to
think through and evaluate each decision throughout the day, the
themselves to a decision, they are loath to change their minds, even when the
cost of a decision is raised significantly and unfairly.
PERLOFF, supra note 121, at 266.
124. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (3d ed. 2012) ("Treat[ing] like cases
alike and different cases different is a central element in the idea of Justice . . . .);
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 162-63 (Sarah Broadie ed., Christopher Rowe trans.,
Oxford University Press 2002).
125. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. _, -, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1252 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
126. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 596 (1987) (explaining that
the use of precedent to treat like cases alike also ensures that courts reach fair decisions).
127. See, e.g., Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir.
2001) (interpreting language in the Americans with Disabilities Act that also appears in
Title VII to mean the same thing); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994)
(interpreting identical language in Title VI and Title IX to mean the same thing).
128. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233 n.4.
129. See Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242, 246 (Conn. 1996) (discussing the
doctrine of stare decisis).
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constraints of precedent similarly free judges.8 o In other words,
the consistency principle leads to "decisional efficiency."'3'
3. The Consistency Principle at Oral Argument
Judges capitalize on the consistency principle in conducting
oral argument. Justice Ginsburg's academic oral argument style 32
lends itself well to use of the consistency principle. Consider the
follow excerpt from Carey v. Musladin:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in here it--you agree that the California
court has as much authority to say what Federal law is as the Ninth
Circuit, right? They are on a par. Ninth Circuit decisions in no way
bind[ the Supreme Court of California. Isn't that so?
MR. FERMINO: That is correct.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that this state court of appeals chose to be
respectful to the Ninth Circuit to consider what it had said, doesn't
sound to me like a very strong argument.
MR. FERMINO: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I would respectfully disa-
134gree.....
Justice Ginsburg first states an indisputable proposition with
which the attorney has to agree: the Ninth Circuit does not bind
the Supreme Court of California and vice versa. As Justice Gins-
burg surely expected, the attorney did agree. Once she secured
his agreement, she notes that the argument that a state court
chose to defer to the Ninth Circuit does not carry much weight.
Although the attorney disagreed, the way that Justice Ginsburg
set up the questions made it difficult for the attorney to hold his
ground.
Justice Thurgood Marshall did much the same thing in Chimel
v. California:3 1
JUSTICE MARSHALL: ... [M]ay I break in just one moment on the
other point? Assuming that they know, they are confident that this
man committed this robbery, and they see him in this side of town,
130. Schauer, supra note 126, at 599.
131. Id.
132. See James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Oral Arguments in the Early Roberts
Court: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Individual Justice Behavior, 11 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 373 (2010) (characterizing Justice Ginsburg as the "[c]onsummate
[a]cademic" in oral arguments).
133. 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
134. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (No.
05-785).
135. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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going toward his home. Is it possible that some detective would say,
"Well, if we arrest him here, we can only search his person; but if we
let him go home, and then arrest him, we can search the attic, the
garage, and anything else," is that possible?
MR. GEORGE: It is possible that officers would do that and defi-
nite-
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, what is different about that case and
this case?
MR. GEORGE: I think it's improper when officers do that. We con-
cede that, and there are cases so holding, that it's improper.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, didn't they deliberately wait at home
136for him? They knew where he was.
Unlike the attorney in Carey, the attorney in Chimel shied
away from answering the question in a way that would make him
look inconsistent (i.e., arguing that there is a difference between
waiting at home and following the defendant there). The attorney
instead provided a chronicle of the events of the officer's day in
response."' The chronicling happened to put the officer at the de-
fendant's house around the time the defendant got off work.'38 But
still, the development of the questions made it difficult for the at-
torney to field Justice Marshall's critical question while maintain-
ing consistency in his responses.
4. The Consistency Principle in Judicial Opinions
Judges also capitalize on the consistency principle when craft-
ing their opinions. One of the most poignant examples comes from
the iconic Walker v. City of Birmingham.'" The petitioners in the
case, civil rights leaders including Martin Luther King, Wyatt
Tee Walker, Ralph Abernathy, and Raymond Shuttlesworth, ap-
pealed their convictions for criminal contempt for violating a
temporary injunction prohibiting them from parading in Bir-
mingham, Alabama without a properly issued city permit.o4 0 The
case divided the Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote, with three of the
four dissenters writing separately.141
136. Transcript of Oral Argument, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (No. 770).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
140. Id. at 311-13.
141. See generally id. at 307-08, 324, 334, 338.
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The injunction that the petitioners violated essentially copied
the language of the Birmingham parade ordinance into a court
order.142 The petitioners contended that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, and as a result, the injunction was unconstitutional
as well.143 Nevertheless, the Court held that they violated the in-
junction.144 When the court held them in contempt, it would not
entertain arguments as to the constitutionality of the language of
the injunction; instead, both the Alabama courts and the Su-
preme Court ultimately held that the petitioners should have
obeyed the injunction and challenged its constitutionality in a di-
rect proceeding instead of the collateral contempt proceeding.14
The tenor of the dissenting opinions suggests that race played
a part in the Alabama state courts' decisions in the casel 46 and in
the Supreme Court's decision. 4 1 In justifying its opinion, the ma-
jority brought the consistency principle to bear by noting that the
Supreme Court of Alabama had not only applied the same rule of
law in the past but that it had done so to a group that presumably
opposed the civil rights movement:
The Alabama Supreme Court has apparently never in any criminal
contempt case entertained a claim of nonjurisdictional error. In
Fields v. City of Fairfield, decided just three years before the present
case, the defendants, members of a "White Supremacy" organization
who had disobeyed an injunction, sought to challenge the constitu-
tional validity of a permit ordinance upon which the injunction was
based. The Supreme Court of Alabama, finding that the trial court
had jurisdiction, applied the same rule of law which was followed
148here ... .
142. Id. at 324 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the "ordinance was copied
into an injunction").
143. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "[s]everal of the Negro ministers
issued statements that they would refuse to comply with what they believed to be, and is
indeed, a blatantly unconstitutional restraining order").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 317-21.
146. See, e.g., id. at 338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('These were the days when Bir-
mingham was a world symbol of implacable official hostility to Negro efforts to gain civil
rights, however peacefully sought.").
147. See, e.g., id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("Under cover of exhortation that the Negro exercise 'respect for judicial process,' the
Court empties the Supremacy Clause of its primacy by elevating a state rule of judicial
administration above the right of free expression guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion.").
148. Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court's use of the consistency principle is master-
ful. It makes the dissenters' suggestions that racial bias tainted
the judicial process appear, at the very least, questionable.
5. The Consistency Principle and Our National Identity
Finally, part of our national identity is a commitment to the
rule of law. As Americans, we pride ourselves on following the
rules, even when the outcome is undesired. To ignore or disregard
judicial directives would seriously threaten our self-perception.
As a result, to remain consistent with our own internal self-
perception, we do what courts tell us to do.149
D. Social Proof
1. An Overview of Social Proof
"[W]e determine what is correct by finding out what other peo-
ple think is correct."5 o More specifically, we perceive behaviors as
acceptable or correct based on whether and to what extent we see
others engaging in those behaviors.'"' Stanley Milgram and his
fellow researchers tested their theory of social proof on a street
corner in New York City.'52 When one planted person stared up at
a building for a minute, pedestrians just passed him by."' The
next day, five people stood on the corner and looked up.'54 This
time, about three times as many pedestrians stopped, and about
eighty percent of the pedestrians looked up as well.'5 ' Social proof
is a powerful tactic of influence. This is why television producers
use laugh tracks, bartenders salt their tip jars, charities publicize
149. The desire to remain consistent with self-perception likely also incentivizes judges
to behave in certain ways. For example, judges may adhere to precedent they may not like
or agree with on a policy level because they perceive themselves as professionals who up-
hold and apply the law. See Donald P. Judges, Who Do They Think They Are?, 64 ARK. L.
REV. 119, 170-76 (2011).
150. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 99; see Janetta Lun et al., (Why) Do I Think What You
Think? Epistemic Social Tuning and Implicit Prejudice, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 957, 957 (2007).
151. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 99.
152. Stanley Milgram et al., Note on the Drawing Power of Crowds of Different Size, 13
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the names of donors, and advertisers emphasize how many people
are using their products.'5 6 The poor reputation of the proverbial
lemming aside, other peoples' actions are typically an effective
proxy for good decision-making."' As a result, we use social proof
as a shortcut in making our decisions.' Unsurprisingly, social
proof is most powerful when (1) we are unsure of ourselves or un-
certain of our surroundings or our current circumstances, and (2)
when the others to whom we look for guidance are similar to us."'
Some commentators have credited social proof as a reason that
investors voluntarily sign away their rights to sue and agree to
arbitration or waive their brokers' fiduciary duties when doing so
is potentially against their interests: if the clause is in the bro-
ker's form contract, others must be signing it, and so it is proba-
bly okay for them to sign as well.''
2. Social Proof in the Judicial System
From the social proof perspective, complying with the direc-
tives issued from the judicial system is something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Everyone else seems to be doing it, so it must
be the right thing to do. Moreover, social proof is at the core of our
system in multiple ways. For example, the doctrine of stare deci-
sis is foundational in legal analysis and decision-making. Relying
156. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 99-100.
157. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 99; see, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Su-
san T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).
158. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 99; HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 157,
at 41.
159. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, When Are Intergroup Attitudes Based on
Perceived Consensus Information?, 2 SOC. INFLUENCE 211, 231 (2007); David B. Wooten &
Americus Reed II, Informational Influence and the Ambiguity of Product Experience: Order
Effects on the Weighting of Evidence, 7 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 79, 79-81 (1998) (noting
that consumers are susceptible to normative and informational influence); Emily M. Zitek
& Michelle R. Hebl, The Role of Social Norm Clarity in the Influenced Expression of Preju-
dice Over Time, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 867, 874 (2007) (noting that one person's
acceptance of discrimination can influence the prejudice-related views of another).
160. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of
Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2011) ('There are a lot of people like me invest-
ing in the stock market and they all signed this contract, too."); G. Richard Shell, Fair
Play, Consent, and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365,
1368-69 (1996) (noting how consumers have many things to worry about and thus they
tend to pass over boilerplate language); cf. Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract
Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (2010) (sug-




on precedent not only ensures that our courts are consistent but
it ensures that judges use the collective decision-making of their
predecessors when analyzing and applying the law. Judges cite
precedent to communicate to their audience-the litigants, panel
members, reviewing courts, legal readers, other judges-that they
are relying on collective wisdom. As a result, a heavily cited prop-
osition is more persuasive because it appears to be more correct
to the reader.'
Reliance on precedent is an antidote to charges of partisan or
activist decision-making.'62 As a result, it is hardly surprising
that the Supreme Court bolsters the appeal of disputed proposi-
tions of law with extensive citation.'" For example, in Walker v.
City of Birmingham,'4 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a hotly
divided court, insisted that all courts follow the simple rule that a
litigant may not violate an injunction and collaterally attack it
later.'6 Justice Stewart offered not less than thirteen cases to
support his statement.166 With so much support, the proposition
seems indisputable. It is not until the reader actually reads those
cases cited or reaches the various dissents that it becomes clear
that Justice Stewart's articulation of the issue is not so simple or
so well supported in the context of the First Amendment.
Similarly, the more subsequent courts cite a particular opinion,
the more correct or important that opinion appears to be. To this
end, an opinion that is cited frequently by subsequent courts is
considered stronger or more important than an opinion that fu-
ture courts ignore.167 As a result, some commentators suggest that
161. Cf. Susan W. Fox & Wendy S. Loquasto, The Art of Persuasion Through Legal Ci-
tations, 84 FLA. B.J. 49, 49-50 (2010) (suggesting that the same reasoning applies in the
context of writing appellate briefs).
162. Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme
Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 418 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that courts rely on precedent to increase the legitimacy of their opinions:
"Individuals consider Supreme Court decisions legitimate because of the perception that
they are based on case-relevant information and not political pressures and public opin-
ion.").
163. Furthermore, research suggests that Justices write differently when they write
majority opinions versus dissents. See Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When
Justices (Subconsciously) Attack: The Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme
Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933, 949-50, 953-54 (2013). In the latter, for example, they use more
intensifiers and stronger language. Id. at 949-50.
164. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
165. See id. at 314.
166. See id. at 314 n.5.
167. See Cross & Spriggs, supra note 162, at 418 ("[The repeated use of precedents re-
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judges cite to their own opinions to increase the power of their
past opinions.'68 In addition, this has the effect of increasing the
perceived power of the writing judge.
Studies also show that judges harness the power of social proof
to influence fellow panel members. For example, a judge is more
likely to cite to legislative history created by legislators who share
her fellow panel members' political persuasion."' Such use of so-
cial proof is likely particularly persuasive because it points panel
members not to legislators in general, but specifically to legisla-
tors that share similar political opinions.
Finally, our jury system is embedded with principles of social
proof. Part of the reason we trust juries with complex cases is be-
cause we generally believe that twelve heads are better than one.
Juries legitimize trial verdicts because we are more likely to per-
ceive the judgment of a large group to be correct than a sole deci-
sion-maker. 170
E. Liking
1. An Overview of Liking
Similar to the rule of reciprocation and social proof, the rule of
liking operates in our judicial system. The rule of liking is quite
simple: we comply with people we like."' Compliance profession-
als take advantage of this rule in a variety of ways. The Tupper-
ware Corporation became famous for conducting all of its sales
through home parties.'72 Instead of an unknown salesperson mak-
ing the pitch, the host, a friend to all of the attendees, encourages
inforces their own significance.").
168. Id. at 419.
169. See Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History:
Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision
Making, 38 J. LEG. STUD. 419, 420-22 (2009) (noting that "Democrat-appointed judges fa-
vor citations of Democrat legislators and Republican-appointed judges favor Republican
legislators").
170. See Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1432-33
(1997). Though the article really focuses on the appearance of citizen participation in gov-
ernment and deflecting criticism away from the judge and dispersing it among a group of
individuals, it is likely that the jury's most powerful legitimating force is simply one of
numbers. We are more likely to comply with a decision that was made by a group of people
rather than one.
171. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 142.
172. Id.
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guests to buy products (in exchange she gets a cut of the pro-
ceeds)."' The sales experience is intertwined with feelings of
friendship and obligation.'74 Significantly, the closeness of the
friendship between the host and guest is much more likely to de-
termine whether the guest purchases a product than preference
for the product itself."' The Tupperware model has exploded, and
it now reaches kitchenware (Pampered Chef), accessories (Sil-
pada Jewelry), home d6cor (Southern Living), and other markets.
Although liking may appear difficult to quantify and predict
because of its subjective nature, certain markers predict who we
will like. Those markers include physical attractiveness, similari-
ty, positive feedback, familiarity, cooperation, and favorable asso-
ciation.
First, we like physically attractive people.'7 6 We associate good-
looking people with a host of favorable qualities, like kindness,
honesty, and intelligence."' Well-groomed job applicants are more
likely to be hired. 7 After attractive people are hired, they get
paid more than their less attractive counterparts."' Attractive
people also fare better in the legal system.' Good-looking crimi-
nal defendants are less likely to go to jail.'"' In civil cases, plain-
tiffs collect more when they are more attractive than defendants;
better-looking defendants pay less.'82
173. Id.
174. Id.; see Rex Taylor, Marilyn's Friends and Rita's Customers: A Study of Party-
Selling as Play and as Work, 26 Soc. REV. 573 (1978).
175. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 142.
176. Id. at 146; Ingrid R. Olson & Christy Marshuetz, Facial Attractiveness Is Ap-
praised in a Glance, 5 EMOTION 498, 498 (2005).
177. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 146; Judith H. Langlois et al., Maxims or Myths of
Beauty? A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 390, 390 (2000).
178. Denise Mack & David Rainey, Female Applicants' Grooming and Personnel Selec-
tion, 5 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 399, 400 (1990).
179. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1174, 1186 (1994) (describing a study that demonstrated significantly lower
hourly earnings for homely men and women).
180. A. Chris Downs & Philip M. Lyons, Natural Observations of the Links Between
Attractiveness and Initial Legal Judgments, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 545
(1991); Karl L. Wuensch et al., Effects of Defendant Attractiveness and Type of Crime on
Juridical Judgment, 6 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 713, 714 (1991).
181. John E. Stewart II, Appearance and Punishment: The Attraction-Leniency Effect in
the Courtroom, 125 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 373, 374, 377 (1980); Wuensch et al., supra note 180,
at 714.
182. See Richard A. Kulka & Joan B. Kessler, Is Justice Really Blind?-The Influence
of Litigant Physical Attractiveness on Judicial Judgment, 8 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 366,
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In addition to attractive people, we are also more likely to like
people who are similar to us.'" We like people who are similar to
us in a variety of ways, from dress to political ideology to back-
ground.'84 For instance, insurance salespersons sell more insur-
ance to customers of a similar age, religion, political ideology, and
cigarette smoking status.'" People are more likely to fill out and
return a mailed survey when the name on the return address is
similar to their own.186 Given the research, it is not surprising
that sales training programs frequently advise trainees to mirror
their customer's posture, mood, and speaking style."'
We also like things and people that are familiar to us.' 8 We are
more likely to vote for politicians whose names sound familiar"'
and prefer products that appear familiar."'o The connection be-
tween familiarity and liking is largely unconscious.' We are
374 (1978) ("Physical attractiveness of litigants did indeed have a significant impact on
juridic decisions . . . . [The] effect was found for both the direction of subject verdicts ...
and the size of damages awarded to the plaintiffs.")
183. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 148; see also Jerry M. Burger et al., What a Coincidence!
The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 35, 41-42 (2004) (noting that perceived incidental similarity with a requester can
lead to increased compliance).
184. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 148; Burger et al., supra note 183, at 35.
185. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 149; F.B. Evans, Selling as a Dyadic Relationship-A
New Approach, AM. BEHAv. SCIENTIST, May 1963, at 76, 79.
186. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 149; Randy Garner, What's in a Name? Persuasion Per-
haps, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 108, 115 (2005) (finding that changing the survey send-
er's name to be similar to recipient's name doubled survey compliance).
187. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 149; see also Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, The
Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction, 76 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 893, 906 (1999) (noting that the chameleon effect-
nonconscious behavior mimicry-was found to increase liking); Kenneth D. Locke & Leon-
ard M. Horowitz, Satisfaction in Interpersonal Interactions as a Function of Similarity in
Level of Dysphoria, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 823, 829 (1990); Rick B. van
Baaren et al., Mimicry for Money: Behavioral Consequences of Imitation, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 393, 396 (2003).
188. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 151.
189. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 152; Joseph E. Grush et al., Extrapolating Laboratory
Exposure Research to Actual Political Elections, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 257,
264-66 (1978); Joseph E. Grush, Impact of Candidate Expenditures, Regionality, and Prior
Outcomes on the 1976 Democratic Presidential Primaries, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 337, 339 (1980).
190. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 152; Xiang Fang et al., An Examination of Different Ex-
planations for the Mere Exposure Effect, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 97, 100 (2007); Wayne D.
Hoyer & Steven P. Brown, Effects of Brand Awareness on Choice for a Common, Repeat-
Purchase Product, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 141, 142-45 (1990) (demonstrating that consum-
ers who were aware of a brand purchased it over unfamiliar brands, even if they had never
purchased the familiar brand before).
191. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 152.
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more likely to believe information that is repeated to us."' In one
study, researchers flashed faces across the screen at a rapid
rate."' They flashed the faces so quickly that participants could
not remember which faces they saw.1 4 When participants later
met the people whose faces had been flashed on-screen, they
tended to like those whose pictures were flashed more frequent-
ly.195
Significantly, the environment within which we become famil-
iar with others affects whether familiarity will trigger liking.'
Exposure under conditions of conflict and frustration leads to less
liking."' On the other hand, we are more likely to like people who
cooperate with us, work with us to overcome obstacles, and help
us solve problems.' One long-term research program at boys'
camps illustrates the principle."' When the researchers separated
192. Id.; Ian M. Begg et al., Dissociation of Processes in Belief: Source Recollection,
Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth, 121 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 446, 446
(1992); Jason P. Mitchell et al., fMRI Evidence for the Role of Recollection in Suppressing
Misattribution Errors: The Illusory Truth Effect, 17 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 800, 801
(2005); see Jennifer L. Monahan et al., Subliminal Mere Exposure: Specific, General, and
Diffuse Effects, 11 PSYCHOL. SCL 462, 464-66 (2000) (demonstrating that individuals ex-
posed to repeated stimuli were reported to be in a better mood than individuals exposed to
new stimuli every exposure); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive
Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 832 (2008); Kimberlee Weaver
et al., Inferring the Popularity of an Opinion from Its Familiarity: A Repetitive Voice Can
Sound Like a Chorus, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 827 (2007); see also Lynn
Hasher et al., Frequency and the Conference of Referential Validity, 16 J. VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 107, 108 (1977).
193. Robert F. Bornstein et al., The Generalizability of Subliminal Mere Exposure Ef-
fects: Influence of Stimuli Perceived Without Awareness on Social Behavior, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1070, 1073 (1987).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1074.
196. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 152-54. Cialdini reports that one of the driving forces
behind school integration was the idea that increased contact with members of different
races would increase liking and decrease racism. Id. at 152. The opposite turned out to be
true: increased contact in school seemed to lead to more racism and less liking. Id. What
researchers discovered was that familiarity in a contentious environment did not lead to
liking; familiarity in a cooperative environment did. Id. at 154. The traditional American
classroom at the time of the study was marked by competition: the teacher asks a ques-
tion; a handful of students strain to answer; others try to become invisible; the teacher
calls on a student who classmates resent if she's right or adjudge her stupid if she's wrong.
Id. at 153.
197. See Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions:
Costs, Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 316,
316-17 (2007).
198. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 154-59.
199. Id. at 154-55; MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION:
THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 9-10 (1961).
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the boys into different cabins, the boys immediately began to like
the boys in the other cabins less.200 Eventually, the groups were
unable to get along in even the most innocuous circumstances.20'
But, when researchers presented the boys with common obstacles
that required them to work together toward common goals, the
boys began to like each other again.202 Ultimately, we like people
who cooperate with us.203
Finally, we like things and people that we associate with posi-
tive people, events, or experiences.204 Further, we like people who
deliver good news; we dislike people who deliver bad news.205 We
view products as more desirable when those products are associ-
ated with something we like, even when that something has zero
impact on product performance.2 0 Compliance professionals are
not the only ones who capitalize on the association principle; we
all have a tendency to link ourselves with positive attributes. As
Cialdini explains, "we purposefully manipulate the visibility of
our connections with winners and losers . . . ."207 Cialdini tested
this theory with Arizona State University ("ASU") students in
1973.208 Cialdini and his team asked some students about the out-
come of a football game that ASU won and then asked others
200. SHERIF ET AL., supra note 199, at 147-48.
201. Id. at 112-13.
202. Id. at 182-83.
203. See id.; see also Stefania Paolini et al., Effects of Direct and Indirect Cross-Group
Friendships on Judgments of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland: The Mediat-
ing Role of an Anxiety-Reduction Mechanism, 30 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL.
770, 781-82 (2004) (noting that cross-community relationships led to reduced anxiety of
persons outside ones group); Stephen C. Wright et al., The Extended Contact Effect:
Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 73, 87-88 (1997) (noting that cross-group friendship leads to pleasant future
interactions and less prejudice).
204. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 159-66.
205. Id. at 160.
206. E.g., George H. Smith & Rayme Engel, Influence of a Female Model on Perceived
Characteristics of an Automobile, in PROC. OF THE 76TH ANN. CONVENTION OF THE AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS'N 681 (1968) (finding that men who saw a car ad starring a beautiful woman
rated the car as faster and better designed than men who saw the ad without the beautiful
woman); Michael White, From Mars Bars to Hot Wheels, Pathfinder Boosts Sales,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 10, 1997), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/From-Mars-bars-
to-Hot-Wheels-Pathfinder-boosts-sales/id-b4bfb7b78872d3f68c826d298604f615 (finding
that sales of Mars candy bars jumped after the Mars Rover rocket successfully landed on
the planet in 1997, even though the candy bar was named for the company's founder and
not the planet).
207. CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 167.
208. Robert B. Cialdini et al., Basking in Reflected Glory: Three (Football) Field Stud-
ies, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 366, 367-68 (1976).
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about a game ASU lost.209 The students who reported on the win-
ning game made efforts to link themselves with the team by re-
ferring to the two as "we": "We won." "We beat Houston." 210 The
students who reported on the losing game distanced themselves:
"They lost." "Arizona State lost."211
2. Attraction-Based Liking in the Judicial System
Looking to our markers of liking, do judges harness the power
of liking to persuade their audiences? It is not clear how some
markers of liking affect the judicial system. For example, does a
judge's physical attractiveness persuade audiences? Although
there is considerable research on the effect of physical attractive-
ness of the parties in a court proceeding,2 12 no research seems to
have considered the question with respect to judges. If the psy-
chological literature is correct, it may be that more attractive
judges appear more persuasive.
3. Similarity-Based Liking in the Judicial System and in
Judicial Opinions
While it appears that emphasizing the similarity of the lawyer
or client may be persuasive to other negotiating parties, juries,
and judges,2 1 3 empirical research has yet to focus on whether
judges that are more similar to their audiences are more persua-
sive by virtue of that similarity. On a macro-level, the demo-
graphic make-up of the judiciary may make it more persuasive to
groups who have something in common with most judges, such as
advanced education, similar economic status, race, gender, age,
etc.214 On a micro-level, the judge who uses language to identify
herself with her audience may be more persuasive to it.
209. Id. at 370-71.
210. Id. at 370-72.
211. Id. at 370-71.
212. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 146; Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Nego-
tiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 829, 831 (2004).
213. See Guthrie, supra note 212, at 829, 831-32.
214. Although researchers have examined public confidence in the judiciary by certain
demographics, the studies do not answer whether the driving force behind confidence lev-
els was tied solely to similarity-based liking versus other factors, such as histories of posi-
tive interaction with or discrimination in the courts. See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller, Public
Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 73
(1970).
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One way that judges show their audiences that they are similar
is through the use of metaphor. The use of metaphor serves the
dual purpose of explaining and persuading. First, and likely the
primary reason judges use metaphor, is to aid their audiences'
understanding of a particular point. Metaphors "are deeply em-
bedded into the way in which we understand the world."215 The
use of metaphor also invokes shared experience.26 Drawing on
that shared experience is part of what makes metaphor a power-
ful persuasive tool: "What we 'know' from [shared] experience is
believed more deeply than anything we learn by listening or read-
ing."217 As a result, metaphor allows judges an opportunity to sub-
tly inform or remind the audience that they are similar because
they partake in the same social culture.
Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas21 8 pro-
vides an example of an effective use of metaphor. One of the
hardest questions that the Court faced in Lawrence was whether
to overrule its precedent in Bowers v. Hardwick, only seventeen
years old at the time, in which the Court upheld a Georgia law
prohibiting sodomy.219 Justice Kennedy carefully dismantled Bow-
ers, writing, "The foundations of Bowers have sustained serious
erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer."220 As such,
Justice Kennedy casts Bowers as a house with serious structural
flaws. Implicit in the metaphor is the common sense solution: the
only foolproof way to fix a house with serious structural flaws is
to tear it down and start fresh. The metaphor communicates the
concept that this is one of the times when the Court should over-
rule past precedent, even from the relatively recent past. And the
use of metaphor presents what would otherwise be an incon-
215. J. Christopher Rideout, Penumbral Thinking Revisited: Metaphor in Legal Argu-
mentation, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 155, 169 (2010). It can even be argued
that we think in metaphor. Id. at 164; see also Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A
Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 275, (2011) ("Without the
metaphorical process that allows us to gather them up, group them together, and contain
them, our perceptions would scatter like marbles thrown on the ground.").
216. Rideout, supra note 215, at 169; Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and
Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance
Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 956 (2007).
217. Berger, supra note 216, at 956. Use of common metaphor and idiom facilitates and
masks constitutional change: "In this way, even the most significant changes to the polity
are made familiar, sensible, and ultimately palatable among various constitutional con-
stituencies." Robert L. Tsai, Democracy's Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2006).
218. 539 U. S. 558 (2003).
219. Id. at 564 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 187-89 (1986)).
220. Id. at 576.
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sistency in a more palatable manner than explicitly stating the
point. Moreover, the metaphor is accessible. Even if a reader is
not a homeowner or someone who works in construction, the met-
aphor creates the picture of a house and draws from common
sense. Sharing this common sense instinct is a way that Justice
Kennedy subtly connects with his audience.
Metaphors made up a linguistic playground for Judge Irving
Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit. For example, his opinion in Shanley
v. Northeast Independent School District, is packed with meta-
phors.22 ' Towards the beginning of the opinion, Judge Goldberg
announces that "[t]his case is anomalous in several respects, a
sort of judicial believe-it-or-not."2 22 Judge Goldberg was not ex-
pressing a sophisticated or controversial concept; readers do not
need the aid of the metaphor to understand and be persuaded by
what he is writing. But the metaphor is an excellent rapport-
builder because Ripley's Believe-It-Or-Not has been a popular
culture fixture since 1918.223 In fact, Ripley was possibly at his
most popular during the 1930s and 1940s,224 when many within
the original audience of Judge Goldberg's 1972 opinion were chil-
dren.
Part of what makes Justice Kennedy's and Judge Goldberg's
metaphors so effective is that they are accessible to large seg-
ments of the audience. When a judge uses a metaphor that is in-
accessible, he risks alienating his audience and hampering its
understanding of his analysis. Justice William 0. Douglas's pe-
numbra metaphor in Griswold v. Connecticutm2 is one example.
Justice Douglas wrote that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance."226 With the aid of
221. 462 F.2d 960, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) (describing the case as a "judicial believe-it-or-
not" and a "constitutional fossil, exhumed and respired to stalk the First Amendment"); id.
at 968 ("While a school is certainly a market place for ideas, it is just as certainly not a
marketplace."); id. at 972 ("[O]ur Constitution is a living reality . . . ."); id. at 973 (present-
ing speech as a "weapon" which may "strike at prejudices and preconceptions"); id. at 978
(concluding that "Tinker's dam to school board absolutism does not leave dry the fields of
school discipline," and continuing the irrigation metaphor throughout the paragraph).
222. Id. at 967.
223. Marc Hartzman, The Believe-It-Or-Not Life of Mister Robert L. Ripley, Millionaire
Freak Fanatic, BIZZARE MAG. (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.bizarremag.com/film-
and-music/interviews/3120/robertjl-ripley.html.
224. Id. (noting that Ripley's fan mail peaked in the 1930s and 1940s).
225. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
226. Id. at 484.
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this metaphor, he reasoned that the right to privacy was implicit
in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.2 27 But
Justice Douglas's penumbra metaphor generated a backlash
amongst his colleagues228 and commentators.22 9 Why?230
Part of the reason that the penumbra metaphor generated a
backlash is it does not actually draw from common experience.
The primary definition of penumbra is "the partial or imperfect
shadow outside the complete shadow of an opaque body. . . where
the light from the source of illumination is only partly cut off." 231
Most people do not think about or have personal associations with
penumbras. The suggestion alone sounds silly. Moreover, Gris-
wold dealt with a politically sensitive issue that received more
media coverage than the typical Supreme Court case, likely in-
creasing its readership among lawyers and lay readers alike.232
Because the audience was so large, a fair number of readers were
probably unfamiliar with the word penumbra.2 " Additionally,
Justice Douglas's use of penumbra is contrary to its actual defini-
tion. He seems to use the image of a penumbra to analogize the
right to privacy to a light emanating from a source."' Thus, the
context in which Justice Douglas uses the penumbra creates in-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("What provision of the Constitution, then, does
make this state law invalid?").
229. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, A Footnote to 'Penumbra" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6
CONST. COMMENT. 251, 263-65 (1989) (criticizing Douglas's choice of "penumbra" in Gris-
wold).
230. Some commentators view metaphor with suspicion. See, e.g., Rideout, supra note
215. Rideout suggests that the reason the penumbra metaphor generated backlash is be-
cause it was technically flawed: it violated the metaphor's "internal systematicity" and its
"external coherence with another metaphor." Id. at 187-88.
231. WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1000 (1991).
232. Justice Douglas was not the first jurist to use the penumbra metaphor. For exam-
ple, Justices Holmes, Learned Hand, and Cardozo also used the penumbra metaphor be-
fore Justice Douglas. See Greely, supra note 229, at 253-60. In none of those cases was the
underlying issue as interesting to a wider audience as Griswold. Moreover, a critical dif-
ference between Holmes', Learned Hand's, and Cardozo's use of penumbra is that they
used the metaphor "to highlight the difficulties of drawing distinctions or meaning." Id. at
260. As a result, while their use of the metaphor probably didn't draw from most readers'
common experience, it did draw from the literal meaning of penumbra. For additional
analysis of the "penumbra" metaphor, see Burr Henly, "Penumbra'" The Roots of a Legal
Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 83-90 (1987).
233. Henry T. Greely agrees, noting that "[p]enumbra is an obscure word, known to few
(and fewer still before Griswold)." Greely, supra note 229, at 251.
234. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Metaphors: The Wall of Separation
and the Penumbra, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 484 (2011) (noting that the penumbra meta-
phor therefore lacks internal coherence).
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ternal dissonance in the reader. As a result, the metaphor does
not emphasize the sameness between the writer and his audi-
ence, and therefore does not create a bond of liking between the
reader and writer. On the contrary, it separates them and creates
an uncomfortable hierarchy between them.235 This is a critical dif-
ference between Justice Kennedy's "house" and Judge Goldberg's
"judicial believe-it-or-not" on the one hand and Justice Douglas's
"penumbra" on the other.
4. Creating Similarity- and Familiarity-Based Liking Through
Conversational Style
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit fosters liking by
using colloquial language frequently in his opinions, which cre-
ates an impression that the writer is a regular guy, not a titan of
the appellate bench. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.236
"pits" twenty-three Liberian children against Firestone.237 Posner
notes in his Flomo opinion that "[o]ne of the amicus curiae briefs
argues, seemingly not tongue in cheek, that corporations
shouldn't be liable under the Alien Tort Statute because that
would be bad for business."2 38 "Tongue in cheek" and "bad for
business" lend an informal feel to his writing. In Indiana Harbor
Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.,239 Judge Posner
noted that the Seventh Circuit "threw out"-not dismissed-the
parties' interlocutory appeal.240 In Indiana Harbor, the amici cu-
riae "cr[ied] wolf" with arguments exaggerating the effects of a
particular ruling on the chemical industry.24 1 In Mucha v. King,2 42
235. Cf. Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22,
1994, at 37, 39 (highlighting the ability of obscure writing to create an "aura of im-
portance" about itself). Of course, most metaphors risk creating hierarchies between the
writer and reader and between different segments of the audience. See Maureen Archer &
Ronnie Cohen, Sidelined on the (Judicial) Bench: Sports Metaphors in Judicial Opinions,
35 AM. BUS. L.J. 225, 226, 230 (1998) (noting that use of sports metaphors "creates a lin-
guistically unlevel playing field" among the readers who get the point and those who do
not). But an accessible metaphor will have a net impact of generating liking, and thus sub-
tly encourage the readers who "get it" to conclude that the opinion is correct.
236. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
237. Id.; see id. at 1019 (explaining why "we keep harping on" a particular issue).
238. Id. at 1021.
239. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
240. Id. at 1175.
241. Id.at 1179.
242. 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986).
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the appellee "smelled a rat."243 Judge Posner's use of colloquial
language makes him seem more similar to and more familiar to
the reader.
In addition to colloquialisms, Judge Posner frequently inserts
parenthetical asides that almost function as a private conversa-
tion between Judge Posner and the reader. These private side
conversations elevate the reader from an invisible passive recipi-
ent to a confidant. At times, the asides communicate informative
tidbits that are immaterial to the case, but that Judge Posner ob-
viously found interesting. For example, in Mucha, the son of an
artist sued to recover one of his father's paintings.2 44 In recounting
the chronology of the events leading to the case, Judge Posner
notes that when the elder Mucha sent a letter to art dealer Sus-
ter, his collection was on display at the Brooklyn Museum.245 As a
parenthetical aside, Judge Posner notes that "[t]his celebrated
exhibition is said to have been seen by 600,000 persons."246 Re
counting another letter between the two, Posner notes that Sus-
ter began with "My dear Brother."2 47 He adds, by way of parenthe-
tical, that "Suster and Mucha were not related, though Suster [,
like Mucha,] was of Czech extraction; the 'My dear Brother' mode
of address may reflect the fact that both were free-masons.""8 In
the same case, Judge Posner relies on Johnson v. Weedman,249
which he parenthetically informs his reader was "a case in which
Abraham Lincoln represented the winning party."250
Other times, Judge Posner uses parentheticals to expand on or
explain a statement he just made. His casual tone maintains the
conversational feel of the opinion, and an aside that could have
come across as slightly patronizing or pedantic simply comes
across as part of the more personal side conversation that Judge
Posner has struck up with the reader. For example, "[clustomary
international legal duties are imposed by the international com-
243. Id. at 612.
244. Id. at 603.
245. Id. at 606.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.; see also id. at 609 (noting the effect of the Depression on the American art
market and parenthetically referencing testimony by Suster that "you couldn't even sell a
dollar for 75 cents").
249. 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 495 (Ill. 1843).
250. Mucha, 792 F.2d at 608.
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munity (ideally, though rarely-given the diversity of the world's
194 nations-by consensus) ... ."251 Judge Posner later explains
that "conventions that not all nations ratify can still be evidence
of customary international law. Otherwise every nation (or at
least every 'civilized' nation) would have veto power over custom-
ary international law. (It would be as if U.S. states could forbid
the enforcement of federal law within their borders.)"2 52
In the same case, Judge Posner explains that the underlying
lawsuit was initially filed in 2005: "initially in California, but it
was transferred to the district court in Indiana the following year,
which is why the docket number in the district court has 06 in
it . ... 253 In this parenthetical, Judge Posner not only continues
his side conversation with the reader, but he also subtly pays the
reader a compliment. The compliment is that he assumes his
reader has paid such close attention to the details of the case that
the reader noticed the case number in the caption, and he further
assumes that his reader is quick enough to recognize the appar-
ent incongruity between the number in the case caption and the
commencement of the suit. Paying a compliment is another effec-
tive way to get someone to like you.254
Finally, Judge Posner sometimes uses parentheticals to inject
humor or sarcasm into his opinions. In summarizing Firestone's
argument that corporations could not be held liable under the Al-
ien Tort Statute because they are not real persons, Judge Posner
writes: "So, according to Firestone, a pirate can be sued under the
Alien Tort Statute but not a pirate corporation (Pirates of the In-
dian Ocean, Inc., with its headquarters and principal place of
business in Somalia . . . . Judge Posner then observes that
"[t]he issue of corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute
seems to have been left open in an enigmatic footnote" in a Su-
preme Court opinion-adding parenthetically "but since it's a Su-
preme Court footnote, the parties haggle over its meaning, albeit
to no avail."25' Both parentheticals function as judicial eye rolls,
shared for the amusement of the opinion's reader but serving no
substantive purpose.
251. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011).
252. Id. at 1021-22 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 1023.
254. See CIALDINI, supra note 3, at 149-50.
255. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
256. Id.
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Judge Posner also enhances the conversational feel of his opin-
ion with the use of italics. He does not just use italics to empha-
size a particular substantive point; he uses them to communicate
directly with his reader. "And suppose no corporation had ever
been punished for violating customary international law. There is
always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to
be."2" And, "[w]e have to consider why corporations have rarely
been prosecuted criminally or civilly for violating customary in-
ternational law; maybe there's a compelling reason."258 The en-
gaged reader can hear these intonations in her head. These aural
thoughts create the impression that Judge Posner is speaking di-
rectly to the reader. Both the side conversation parentheticals
and the italicized conversational tone enhancers foster a personal
relationship between Judge Posner and his reader. This is anoth-
er subtle form of persuasion; just as the Tupperware Corporation
discovered, people are more easily persuaded by those with whom
they have a personal relationship."'
5. Cooperation-Based Liking
Judge Posner further fosters liking by frequently structuring
his opinions in a non-traditional format. Under the traditional
format, the writer conducts his analysis to reach his conclusion as
part of the pre-writing/thought process stage.' Then, when he
writes his opinion, he converts the thought process leading to the
conclusion into the typical written organization of issue/con-
clusion, rule, explanation, affirmative analysis, counter analysis,
and disposition.261 Unlike the traditional writer, Judge Posner in-
stead often appears to write his opinions according to the thought
process that led him to his ultimate conclusion. This changes the
dynamic of the opinion from a pronouncement of the law deliv-
ered to the reader to an intellectual journey that the reader takes
alongside Judge Posner. Organizing the opinion as a journey cap-
italizes on the cooperation aspect of liking. Judge Posner does not
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1018.
259. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. And so in this analogy, Judge
Posner is a theoretical judicial Tupperware party host.
260. See MARY L. DUNNEWOLD ET AL., JUDICIAL CLERKSHIPs: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 90-93
(2010).
261. See id. at 134-36.
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simply tell us what the law is; he takes us with him and we reach
the result together.
Accordingly, instead of starting with his conclusion, Judge
Posner sometimes poses the issue and then gives a general tuto-
rial on the development of the applicable law or dismisses various
arguments. He also might not state the rule of the case up front.
Instead, he sometimes explores the development of the law, how
it got to be what it is at the time of his writing, and why the law
makes sense (or not).
For example, in Flomo, Judge Posner first notes that the issues
were whether a corporation could be held liable under the Alien
Tort Statute and, if so, whether plaintiffs established a fact issue
as to whether Firestone violated customary international law.262
Instead of stating the rule of corporate liability or identifying the
applicable customary international law, Judge Posner then asks:
"And what is 'customary international law'?"263 With this rhetori-
cal question, the journey begins. Judge Posner gives the reader a
tutorial on customary international law, which includes some his-
tory, some definition, and some critique.2 64 None of the tutorial is
technically necessary to the opinion. After the tutorial has con-
cluded, Judge Posner begins his analysis with Firestone's argu-
ment that it cannot be held liable because it is a corporation, not
a human being.265 Judge Posner lists the potentially applicable
case law, noting the single decision that supports Firestone's ar-
gument, and he then explains why that case was based on a fac-
tually and theoretically false premise."' Now that Firestone's key
argument is mostly out of the way, Judge Posner explores com-
mon sense reasons to hold corporations liable under the Alien
Tort Statute.2 67 He concludes his analysis by identifying two ex-
emplar cases that support holding corporations liable, and he
does so almost as an afterthought: "And if precedent for imposing
liability for a violation of customary international law by an enti-
ty that does not breathe is wanted, we point to in rem judgments
262. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1015.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1015-16.
265. Id. at 1017 (using a humorous parenthetical to define corporations as all entities
without a heartbeat).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1018-21.
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against pirate ships.""' A traditional opinion format would have
instead started with precedent and ended by dismissing Fire-
stone's arguments.
Judge Posner's alternative organization lends his opinions a
distinctly different feel than traditionally organized opinions and
it creates a different relationship with the reader. Even though
the formal dynamic of judge as decider/writer and reader as recip-
ient remains static across opinions, Judge Posner's organization
transforms the reader's experience into a more active one by tak-
ing the reader along his thought process. This active experience
feels cooperative and participatory, which increases liking.26 9
The powerful persuasive effect of Judge Posner's opinions poses
a challenge to the traditional structure of legal analysis. Law
students, lawyers, and judges alike are advised to use some vari-
ant of the Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion ("IRAC") form to
structure their legal arguments.270 The traditional wisdom pro-
vides that the best-organized analyses start with the affirmative
analysis and then turn to counter-arguments.2 ' Posner embraces
the opposite. He takes the reader through each possible answer
and casts it aside until, together, they reach the correct result at
the end of the journey.
Are most judges (and other legal writers) doing it wrong? There
is a key difference between many of Judge Posner's opinions and
traditional judicial opinions: Judge Posner writes not simply to
resolve dispute but to advance the law and shape policy.' The
268. Id. at 1021.
269. Another reason Judge Posner's structure could be more persuasive than the tradi-
tional structure is that, as the reader and Judge Posner cooperate to reach the right re-
sult, the reader has more stake in the outcome because she feels more ownership in the
conclusion. As a result, the conclusion has special persuasive power. Relatedly, Professor
Michael Higdon suggests that judicial use of foreshadowing has the same effect. See Mi-
chael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes ... The Use of Foreshadowing as a
Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2010). As Profes-
sor Higdon explains, "if a writer could construct a written document in such a way that
the reader is quietly helped to form hypotheses that match the writer's ultimate conclu-
sion, then that conclusion would likely be more acceptable and thus more persuasive to
the reader." Id. at 1223.
270. See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
LEGAL ANALYSIS 81-85 (Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2013); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 75-90 (3d ed. 2010).
271. See, e.g., BEAZLEY, supra note 270, at 95-99.
272. Richard A. Posner, Foreword to THE QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS xi (Robert F. Blomquist ed., 2010).
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vast majority of judicial opinions, on the other hand, apply the
law to resolve a dispute; they do not advance the law or shape
policy. So, what works well for Judge Posner might not necessari-
ly work well for other judges.
III. CONCLUSION
It comes as no surprise that salespersons and marketing de-
partments rely on psychological influence tactics to persuade
their targets. But they are not the only ones: we all use these tac-
tics in our personal and professional relationships. Significant-
ly-and far less intuitively-even judges use psychological influ-
ence tactics that have the effect of persuading their audience.
They rely on the rule of reciprocation and make concessions to
one side or the other. In so doing, they appear to bestow victories
on both sides of a dispute. As a result, the parties more readily
accept their losses and feel treated more fairly by the process.
Judges harness the power of commitment and consistency
through the doctrine of stare decisis. If past courts have reached a
similar decision, then it seems more acceptable for a present
court to do the same. And, once we have committed to a particu-
lar path, it's far easier to comply with it than it is to deviate from
it.
Judges rely on social proof and show us that other judges and
courts did the same thing. If we can see that everyone else is do-
ing it, we are less likely to question doing it. Judges also rely on
our desire for consistency, and they convince us that we should
accept their opinions because we have done so in the past.
Judges make us like them in a variety of ways: they draw on
shared experience through metaphor; they become familiar to us
through colloquialisms; they establish parenthetical dialogues
with us to share interesting asides, to make a joke, or to pay a
compliment. These dialogues make us feel as though we are less
passive observers of and are more active participants in the deci-
sion-making process. Reading their metaphors, colloquialisms,
and parenthetical asides is a transformative process. Instead of
judge and reader, we become almost-friends. And we want to say
"yes" to our friends because we say "yes" to people we like.
Now that we know judges use psychological influence tactics,
the next step is to determine what that means. At the outset, just
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being aware of the use of influence tactics makes us more savvy
consumers of judicial writing. Moreover, to the extent that judges
use influence tactics subconsciously, making the use of those in-
fluence tactics a fully conscious exercise could affect how and
when judges use the tactics, which tactics they use, and whether
they continue to use them at all.
Part of the reason that professionals use influence tactics in
the marketplace is because they can use those tactics to manipu-
late our responses to produce the behavior they want. Viewed
through this lens, judges' use of influence tactics appears less
than desirable. It raises questions about the ethical limits of
judges' use of persuasion in their writing.
Perhaps the most significant questions that judges' use of in-
fluence tactics raise go to the operation and legitimacy of court
systems. Do judges on multi-member courts and panels use influ-
ence tactics to rally support from their colleagues? Did American
judges use influence tactics in their writing when the United
States was a fledgling democracy and the future position of the
courts was uncertain? Could courts in emerging democracies use
influence tactics to help legitimize their nation's new judicial sys-
tems?
Further examining judges' use of influence tactics and answer-
ing these questions will deepen our understanding of, and enrich
the dialogue about, judicial writing and judicial decision-making.
This will inform how we create, consume, and use judicial writ-
ing.
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